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The institutional influence, specifically trade unions, on the job insecurity of workers in 
Foreign-owned Enterprises (FoEs) has been generally overlooked. This study uses national 
representative private sector data to examine firm’s layoff incident and the number of staff 
made redundant in response to the recent 2008-2012 recession in the UK. Our probit 
regression and the Negative-Binomial regression show that overall FoEs appear to be more 
likely to undertake redundancy and to lay off more workers than Domestically-owned 
Enterprises. However, the strength of trade unionism, measured by union membership 
density, has a moderating effect in the incident of redundancies controlling for the adverse 
impact of the recession on companies studied and a wide range of industrial and firm 
characteristics. Furthermore, FoEs’ headquarter location seems to have no effect on the 
propensity of layoff or quantity of layoff in the UK. 




Multinational Enterprises’ (MNEs) activity and the process of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) have been an important part of the globalised world economy and contributed 
significantly to employment in host countries (UNCTAD, 2017).  In Ireland, for example, it 
was estimated that one in five workers are employed by foreign MNEs (The Irish Times, 
2016), whereas in the UK more than half of large companies have been foreign owned since 
2009 (Brummer, 2012). There has been a lasting concern about job insecurity in Foreign-
owned Enterprises (FoEs) compared to Domestically-owned Enterprises (DoEs), especially 
during a major recession. A few extant studies endeavoured to examine the association 
between FoEs and plant closures, but produced mixed findings, for a summary see Wagner 
and Gelubcke (2012).  
 
This study intends to investigate layoff at FoEs in the UK during the 2008-2012 recession 
and aim to contribute in three ways. First, we empirically examine the differences of a 
discreet form of job insecurity, redundancy, between FoEs and Domestically owned 
Enterprises (DoEs).  Redundancy is subtle compared with plant closure and tends to be 
overlooked at FoEs (Andrews, et al., 2012), this study thus further our understandings at the 
microeconomic level of job insecurity by taking into account ownership types (Brewster et 
al., 2015; Ellonen and Natti, 2015; Navaretti et al., 2003; Otto et al., 2016). Staff perceived 
job insecurity at FoEs which caused more concern of the result reliability (Dill and Jirjahn, 
2016).  Secondly, we examine the moderating role of trade unions on the relationship 
between the actual job insecurity, redundant incident and firm’s ownership. This reduced the 
concern of subjective job insecurity (self evaluated job insecurity) associated with FoEs (Dill 
and Jirjahn, 2016) ands provokes debates on the reported subjective job insecurity) associated 
with union membership withdrawal behaviour (Sverke and Goslinga, 2003) and union’s 
support has no influence on the subjective job insecurity caused mental health (Hellgren and 
Chirumbolo, 2003). It may offer partial explanation to the newly observed union activism 
under the adverse economic condition (Angrave et al., 2017). Thirdly, we examine the 
relationship between location of the source country headquarters’ FoEs and job insecurity for 
the increased globalisation featured by growing FDI from emerging market in developed 
economies (Seal, 2016).  To do so, we used the national representative data collected in UK, 
1,500 observations extracted from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 
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2011), during a critical time period when British economy experienced a double dip 
recession.  The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical underling of 
firm level practices: redundancy and foreign ownership, and from which we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes methodology and the data set used. The empirical analysis is 
presented in Section 4, followed by a discussion in Section 5. Finally, conclusions were 
drawn from the analysis. 
2. Literature review 
2.1  Foreign ownership and job insecurity in the host country 
One considerable emphasis towards FoEs placed by policy makers is that FoEs can lead to 
significant positive employment effects in host countries and regions. This employment effect 
was grounded in a range of academic studies (Barrell and Pain, 1997; Driffield, 1999; Heise 
et al, 2002a; Navaretti et al., 2003) and evident in terms of both new job creation and 
spillover effect (McDonald et al., 2005; Inekwe, 2013). However, the concern of job 
insecurity at FoEs has come from at least the following reasons: first, it is the “footloose” or 
“easy come easy go” syndrome (Adam, 1975).  FoEs can shift production between locations 
more easily and may exercise such advantage during economic downturn ( Blanchard et al., 
2012; Bernard and Sjoholm, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 2007; Fabbri et al., 2003;  McAleese 
and Counahan, 1979); partly also due to the short-term profit focus found among FoEs (Dill 
et al., 2016).  Secondly, researchers have attributed a higher elasticity of labour demand to 
job insecurity at FoEs than DoEs for a number of reasons. Deepening international 
integration of production results in more elastic product demand, labour as a derived demand 
related to the former, and with increased competition and volatility at the product markets, 
the demand for labour becomes more volatile, thus lead to higher fluctuation in labour 
demand (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Geishecker, et al., 2012); international trade can also 
make domestic labour more substitutable with foreign production factors (Slaughter, 2001)   
Thirdly, the employment volatility tend to higher at FoEs than DoEs (Fabbri et al.. 2003; 
Merikull and Room, 2014). FoEs tend to implement new production concepts and 
management practices in overseas subsidiaries that often involve a substantial reorganization 
and job loss.  The presence of a great use of performance management at FoEs than DoEs 
entails the implicit or explicit threat to dismiss in case of low performance of staff or under 




However, empirical studies have produced mixed findings, “highly country-dependent” , 
Wagner and Gelubcke (2012) have made a good summary. Take the U.K. for exapme, Farris 
et al. (2003) using plant-level panel for all British manufacturing from 1973 through 1992 
and found that multination plants are more likely to shut down than domestic plants are, 
despite of operational advantages enjoyed by multinationsl that make them less likely to shut 
down., while others reported there is no significant closure rate differences between FoEs and 
DoEs (McLeese and Conahan, 1979; Harris, 2009).  
The U.K. is of interest for a number of reasons, including being the second largest host 
economies for inward FDI among developed countries (Jost 2013) and is relatively successful 
to attack inflow FDI than its EU continental partners due to its lower labour protection 
compared with its EU counterparts and (Haaland et al.,2003; Jirjahn, 2017).  With 70% 
economic activities in Britain are related with the rest of the world, mainly carried out by 
FoEs (ONS, 2014), makes FoEs more vulnerable to external market shocks. Deeper 
international economic integration makes domestic workers more easily substitutable by 
foreign workers (Rodrik, 1997).Higher financial or economic shock can prompt such 
substitute-seeking behavior. The 2008-2012 recession had the worst impact on the UK 
economy since 1997, with unemployment rate climbing to 8.5% in 2012, and 3.7 million 
workers were made redundant since 2008 (Aol, 2013).    Considering less political pressure 
and fewer social obligations to preserve jobs at FoEs than DoEs,  FoEs may use redundancy 
to get rid of ‘expensive’ labour in the wake of the recession either downsizing or substituting 
labour for capital with minimum fuss.  In addition, FoEs tend to be large in size in the UK, 
with 10% of FoEs of non-Financial Business employing at least 250 people compared with 
only 0.3% of the similar DoEs in 2012 (ONS, 2014), and large firms were found more likely 
to use redundancy instead of other means to cope with economic downturn (Lai et al., 
2016).We therefore propose that  
 
Hypothesis 1a:  FoEs are more likely to lay off workers in the UK during the 2008-2012 
recession than DoEs. 
Hypothesis 1b: FoEs tend to make more staff redundant than DoFs. 
2.2 Trade Union and Job Security 
As Hyman (2002:57) stated that “jobs are always at the mercy of economic and technological 
vagaries”. Technological or external economic shocks may cost jobs, but there are a range of 
softer mechanisms firms have at their disposal, such as redeployment, pay freezes, temporary 
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closures, and unpaid leave (Lai et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018).  Whether or not workers can 
constrain the imposition of compulsory redundancies is subject to their ability to mobilise 
countervailing power (Kelly, 2012; Olson, 2009). Empirical studies show that well-supported 
collective bargaining with the threat of collective action (strikes) can curb the use of 
compulsory lay-offs in firms with more than 100 employees (Brewster et al., 2015) or the fact 
that union members equipped by better legal advice can defer MNCs’ opportunistic 
behaviour (Jirjahn, 2017).  This latter is our main focussince FoEs tend to be large in the UK 
and tends to use compulsory redundancies more readily when unions are weak and collective 
bargaining unavailable. This is despite relatively clear and supportive legislation imposed on 
large firms to protect workers from reckless ‘hire and fire’ practices (Brewster et al., 2015).  
Our understandings of unions’ protection in jobs in the micro-economic environment have 
been under researched (Ellonen and Natti, 2015). This is important due to a well documented 
continuing decline in numbers, density and influence of British trade unions (Bryson and 
Forth, 2011) and parallels similar developments in other countries (Gumbrell-McCormick 
and Hyman, 2013). 
Although, the decline of union members in Britain has been dramatic in the last three decades 
from 13 million in 1979 to 6.5 million in 2015, and union members only makes up 13.9% of 
the workforce in the private sector (ONS, 2015), unions remain strong in some sectors and 
regions and their ability to bargain in the collective interests of their members remains high in 
some workplaces (Glassner et al., 2011).  Large businesses are more likely to be unionized 
(Brewster et al., 2015; Schnabel, 2013). One main objective of trade unions is the employment 
security of their members alongside wage increases (Pencavel, 1984; Gall, 2003). One way in 
which unions support their members is by being the workplace ‘police force’ for the 
implementation of laws governing such areas as health and safety, equality, and compulsory 
redundancies (Metcalf, 2013). Larger firms are under more pressure to abide by legal 
regulations that protect employment (ACAS, 2014; Venn, 2009). A lengthy process of 
compulsory redundancies can prove to be both expensive and difficult when faced with 
strong union organisation. 
In addition, Unions can safeguard jobs through collective negotiations (Kaufman and Bennett 
2017) when its influence is strong.  Union strength in such situations is derived from a 
number of factors including, inter alia, density levels (Visser, 2013), degree of company-
level organisation and activity (Waddington and Kerr, 2009), support from the national union 
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(Kelly and Heery, 2009), and wider political interest in the behaviour of foreign-owned firms 
when it comes to local employment issues (Traxler and Brandl 2010). Therefore, it may 
persuade senior decision makers to negotiate alternatives of layoff (Glassner and Keune 
2010).  Therefore, trade union strength can reduce the likelihood of a compulsory redundancy 
regime. 
Hypothesis 2: Union strength will reduce the propensity to layoff at FoEs. 
2.3 Countries of origin and employment insecurity in host country 
 
Country of origin has been shown to play a substantial role in determining employment 
volatility in at least three aspects. First, it influences the MNE decision makers’ willingness 
to undertake FDI in particular foreign locations, the types of FDI that they employ and the 
resultant effects upon employment (Buck et al., 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2015). Many 
MNEs concentrate their inward investment activities in countries or regions possessing the 
smallest geographical, cultural and psychic distance from their headquarters’ location, in 
order to minimize the resultant perceived risks (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2015). Such 
Uppsala approaches, as noted by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and Johnason and 
Vahlne (1977), although being extended by Vahlne et al. (2011),  has been criticised by 
others such as Lyles et al. (2014) as not being appropriate to international expansion. 
Secondly, institutional approximation between the EU and UK may contribute to reducing 
entry and transaction costs for EU firms operating in the UK. If so, it is reasonable to expect 
that EU-originating investments in the UK will be less speculative and of a more long-term 
strategic character compared with investments from other parts of the world, thus plausibly 
having a more positive impact on employment in the recipient host economy. Thirdly, labour 
market institutions determine the flexibility that a firm can alter labour costs in order to adjust 
to demand fluctuation. This is typically reflected by the level of employment protection of 
national labour regulations and the influence of trade unions.  FoEs from a more flexible 
labour market, such as emerging market, may have a tendency to change labour costs 
(through quantity change of labour) than those from a more rigid labour market. For example, 
Merikull and Room (2014) found that the elasticity of labour demand at FoEs is country-
specific, subject to the degree of labour market protection between their home and host 
countries.   
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Although UK is the most popular destination of investors from the emerging market (Seal, 
2016), FoEs are predominately from the EU and North America. For example, in the non-
financial business economy in 2012, the majority (54%) of FoEs were owned from within 
Europe, and with a third (33%) owned from within North and South America, the rest was 
owned by the rest of the world (ONS, 2014).   Since the geographic location and labour 
market regulations have been important factors for strategic decisions behind FDI (Buck et al, 
2001; Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2015) and considering headquarters of North American FoEs 
is more geographically distant than its counterpart in the EU; and the low employment 
protection in the former than in the latter, we would, ceteris paribus, expect that: 
Hypothesis 3: EU owned-FDI is less likely to layoff workers than American-owned FDIs in 
the UK. 
3.Research methodology  
3.1 Background to the sample 
 
The data for this study were taken from the nationally representative Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey 2011 (WERS 2011) in the UK.  The WERS has been undertaken every six 
years since 1980; and the dataset includes management data (interviews with senior HR 
managers), employee data (surveys of up to 25 employees within the associated organisation) 
and one formal employee representative per organization if there is any. This paper is based 
on cross-sectional management data of 2011 with 2,680 organisations with a workforce 
exceeding five employees or more.  The data were collected between March 2011 and June 
2012 when UK was experiencing a ‘double-dip’ recession following the financial crisis of 
2008. 
As a national data set, the WERS 2011 data have the advantage of collecting national 
representative information on employment practices in a changing economic environment 
(Whyman et al., 2015).  Given the recent recession, alongside the standard set of common 
questions asked to HR managers about their HR practices and workforce characteristics, 
WERS2011 includes a number of additional questions aimed at capturing the impact of 
recession and employment practices since the economic downturn of 2007/2012. It also 
included questions on the ownership of firms, eliciting information as to whether the 
organisation was in domestic or foreign ownership, as well as whether the organisation was 
publicly or privately owned at the time the survey was completed.  This paper is concerned 
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with the contrasting response to the recession between domestic and foreign-owned 
workplaces in the same industry of the private sector.   Industries where there were no foreign 
ownership in the survey were therefore excluded from the analysis. This included Education, 
Public administration, and Real Estate activities.  In excluding these industries the total 
number of usable observations in the private sector was reduced to 1,500 workplaces. 
3.2 Measures 
Redundancy was defined as whether or not the organisation undertook compulsory or 
voluntary redundancy in response to the recession of 2008/2012. There were 439 workplaces 
which reported that redundancies had been made, accounting for 29% of the sample.  The 
extent of the redundancy behaviour was measured in two ways.  Firstly, by the number of 
employees made redundant and secondly by the proportion of workforce made redundant. 
The former is the number of employees laid off during the previous 12 months before the 
survey took place. There were 278 firms that provided the exact number of employees who 
were laid off in that period. The mean number of people made redundant among these 
workplaces was 29, with a range of between 1 to 1,000 persons. The latter was calculated by 
dividing the number of people made redundant by the number of employees on payroll during 
the previous year. The mean workforce made redundant among these firms was 8%, although 
the proportion made redundant in any specific firm ranged from 0.1% to 76%.  
Foreign ownership. There are a number of ways of defining whether a domestic organisation 
is foreign owned, for example, the OECD (2003) suggests that a controlling interest can be 
established within a domestic firm, if a foreign owner has a minimum of 10% of the ordinary 
shares or voting shares within a domestic company.  For the purpose of this study however, 
we used more stringent measurement: FoEs is defined as the foreign owner has a greater than 
50% ownership of the domestic firm. This is also due to the information availability in 
WERS 2011 study. There were 366 FoEs in the sample accounting for 24% of the total 
number of firms. 
MNE’s Head office location was the source country behind FoE activity in the UK.  Of the 
338 MNEs in the sample, the location of their head offices was distributed between UK 
(42%), Europe (21%), North America (19%), and Japan and others (18%). Given the spatial 
distribution of these head offices, it was also possible to evaluate whether the location of the 
head office had an impact on changes in absolute and relative employment patterns after the 
2008/2012 recession.   
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3.3 Model specification 
Since we intend to analyse a comparison of the redundancy behaviour: 1. between FoEs and 
DoEs; 2. among FDIs with different head office locations; we have 1500 observations for 
question 1 and 344 observations for question 2. To examine the comparison between two or 
more groups, two Probit regressions are employed. The moderating effect is tested by an 
interactive item. 
In order to examine the extent of layoff between FoEs and DoEs if redundancies had been  
made (366 firms), we consider both the absolute number of employees made redundant and 
the proportion of workforce laid off. For the former, since the distribution of the number of 
employees made redundant is over-dispersed, in particular, with the conditional variance (47) 
exceeding the conditional mean (29), a negative binomial regression was considered the 
appropriate statistical method (UCLA, 2014).  For the latter, since most value of the 
proportion of workforce laid off is between 0.2 and 0.8, an Ordinary Least Squares regression 
was employed which is considered to be more reliable (Long, 1997)   
4. Analysis 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
In Table 1, the results indicate that foreign ownership, workplace size, the extent of adverse 
effect caused by the recession are positively and significantly correlated with the likelihood 
that firms undertook redundancy. Trade union strength is negatively and significantly 
correlated with redundant behavior.  Other variables show correlations as expected, for 
example, the higher unionised workforce is positively correlated with the size of the firm.  
 
A T-test was undertaken, in Table 2, in order to compare the mean differences in the 
organisational characteristics between FoEs and DoEs. The results show that 40% of FoEs 
had made some employees redundant in response to the recent recession, compared with only 
25% of DoEs which took this action, a result which is significantly different (|T|=5.51, 
p<0.001) between the two types of organisations. There was no significant difference, 
however, in terms of the adverse effect of recession on their businesses between DoEs and 
FoEs. FoEs tend to have a larger proportion of union members than DoEs. The average 




In terms of business activities, FoEs have a significantly higher presence in manufacturing 
(25%), electricity, gas, steam and air (9%), financial and insurance (6%), transportation and 
storage (7%),  and information and communication (6%) compared with UK owned firms; 
the proportions of which were 11%,  1% , 1%, 4% and 4% respectively. Conversely, DoEs 
were more likely to have a bigger presence in the accommodation and food service sector, 
human health and social work sector, the arts, entertainment and recreation, and other 
services.  A similar proportion of FoEs, 18% compared with DoEs, 17%, were presented in 
wholesale and retail sector, and because of near equality, this is used as the base group in 
further regression analysis.  
 
It is also possible to examine the nature of the workforce employed between FoEs and DoEs. 
The WERS 2011 data categorises the workforce into six groups based upon the largest 
occupation group at the workplace according to the Standard Occupational Classification 
2010.  There is a significantly higher proportion of higher managerial and professional 
employees (15%) among FoEs, compared with 7% of DoEs. The latter were more likely to 
employ lower-skilled workers. Over one third (35%) of DoEs categorized the largest 
occupational group in their workforce as being in semi-routine jobs and almost a further fifth 
(22%) had their largest occupational group placed within routine jobs.  However, the 
proportion in FoEs is 25% and 14%, respectively. Since both FoEs and DoEs have a similar 
share of the largest occupation group as being in intermediate occupations, it is used as the 
base group in subsequent regressions.  
 
Before undertaking our regression analysis, we tested the extent of multicollinearity among 
main variables; the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was computed. The VIF has values 
ranging from 1.1 to 1.4, far below the threshold of 10 (Whyman et al., 2015), suggesting 
multicollinearity is not a concern.  
4.2 Regression Results 
This study seeks to explore the redundancy behaviour between FoEs and DoEs during the 
recent recession in the UK. The first probit regression result reported in Table 3. We further 
explored the extent of redundancies made between FoEs and DoEs  in Table 4, 5 and 6. We 
then examined the potential impact of location of MNEs’ head offices on their redundancy 




In Table 3, using the whole sample of 1,500 observations, specification 1 shows that FoEs are 
moderate significantly correlated with the likelihood to make workers redundant (b=0.22, 
p<0.05) when other observable characteristics are the same: size, history, impact of recession, 
the presence of union strength and controlling for industry and occupation groups.  This 
provides empirical evidence to support our hypothesis 1a. In line with extant literature, those 
organisations that had been greatly affected by the recession and larger firms are positively 
and significantly correlated with carrying out redundancies. Specification 2 of Table 3, an 
interaction item between union strength (using density as a proxy for strength measured as a 
percentage of employees unionised) and foreign ownership was included, the coefficient is 
negative and significant (b= - 0.66, p<0.10), indicates that foreign-owned enterprises with 
high union presence is less likely to make staff redundant.  This provides evidences to show 
the countervailing power of trade union, therefore supports hypothesis 2. 
In Table 4, we examined determinants of the proportion of the workforce was made 
redundant; and in Table 7, we look at factors that are correlated with staff number of layoffs. 
 The regression in Table 4 shows that FoEs are significantly (b=0.05, P<0.01) more likely to 
make a higher proportion of their workforce redundant during the recession. When large 
firms laid-off a smaller proportion of their workforce, this could entail a larger absolute 
number of employees. This is confirmed in Table 5, where a positive and significant 
correlation between the numbers of employees made redundant and firm size was established.  
After controlling for firm size, the reported impact caused by recession, and union strength, 
industry and occupation group, again the correlation between FoEs and higher absolute 
number of redundancies is significant (b=0.95, p<0.001). This provides evidence to support 
our hypothesis 1b.   
 
Apart from analysing the differences of offloading employees between DoEs and FoEs as 
response to the recent financial crisis in the UK, this paper also examined the potential 
different responses of the FoEs from different source countries in Table 6. Using FoE’s head 
office based in the UK as the base group, there was no significant difference between this 
base group and those FoEs that had their head offices in America, Europe or Asia (in the first 
column of the regression) as to whether these firms undertook redundancy. Instead, it shows 
that firm size (b= 0.13, p<0.05) and recession impact (b= 0.58, p<0.01) are positively and 
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significantly correlated with redundancy among FoEs in the UK.  Therefore, our hypothesis 3 
is not supported. 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Theoretical implications 
The present study investigates job insecurity at FoEs during the 2008-2012 recession, and we 
found that FoEs appear to be more likely to undertake a redundancy and to lay off a higher 
proportion of workforce or more workers than DoEs even after controlling the degree of 
adverse impact caused by the recession, firm size, firm history, type of industry and 
workforce components. However, the likelihood to make a redundancy is significantly 
attenuated by the strength of trade union. 
 
Our findings added a new dimension of job insecurity, redundancy, in safeguarding jobs in 
the FoEs; and one new aspect of  job insecurity study at microeconomic level by taking into 
account firm’s ownership (Brewster et al., 2015; Ellonen and Natti, 2015; Otto et al., 2016). 
This may attribute to a more elastic labour demand in the FoEs than DoEs (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2007; Fabbri et al., 2003) and its’ footloose syndrome (Gorg and Strobl, 2003). To 
some extent, it confirms the lower employment commitment of FoEs driven by fewer risks 
involved in large-scale layoffs than DoEs. Such risks include reputational damage, adverse 
political commentary, local opposition, and potential loss of customer base. This reflects the 
short-term profit driven nature of FoEs (Dill et al., 2016) since a long-term concern of DoEs 
will further restrain layoff decision, for example, post-recession, if wish to expand, it will 
require government support and local population agreement (Jack, 2018).  However, there did 
not appear to be any support for the fact that institutional differences between the source country and 
host county impacted on the redundancy incident and quantity of layoff.  
 
More importantly, it shows the influence of union strength when examining a discreet form 
of job insecurity, redundancy, at FoE’s. A negative but not statistically significant 
relationship between the level of employment protection legislation and job destruction was 
summarized by Haaland et al.(2003 p.18). We empirically examine the influence of the actor 
to “police” employment protection legisaltions.  Trade union as a collective actor plays a 
main role when members’ employment is threatened. In Table 2, the average of union 
strength (measured by percentage of employees are union member) of FoEs are a lot higher, 
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0.21, than that of DoEs, 0.08.  In Table 3, it shows that union strength can curtail the 
tendency to layoff at FoEs. The moderation effect was further explored through the marginal 
effect (difference-in-difference) of union density on the likelihood to make redundant 
between FoEs and DoEs in Figure 1, it shows, FoEs are more likely to lay off employees than 
DoEs when union density is low, but such likelihood declines and even become negative with 
the increased union density. 
Practical implications 
It follows therefore, that UK as an open economy where the rest of world now holds 
approximately 54% of the UK stock market share since 2012 (ONS, 2015).   It has placed 
employment contribution at the regional and national level on inbound FDI as a leading 
policy priority to promote this type of investment (McDonald et al., 2005). However, 
shareholders’ interests override those of workers, customers, suppliers, innovation, 
communities, as evidenced by Kraft Foods took over the Cadbury in 2010 (Jack, 2018). 
Although the current prime minister, Theresa May has warned big business that the 
government would step in where markets failed to produce an economic model that worked 
for everyone, the discreet form of job insecurity, redundancy, has been overlooked (ESRC, 
2010). This study shows that trade unionism is one of the important countervailing forces to 
safeguarding jobs, through policing regulations, in particular at MNEs (Pohler and Riddell 
2015). Meanwhile, the source country of the FoEs did not have effect upon job insecurity, 
suggesting that policy makers do not have to target specific countries from overseas 
investment. 
5.2 Limitations of the study and suggestion for future study 
There are a few limitations of this study which need to be addressed. First, this study 
examined firm level institutions on employment practices of FoEs in host country. To be 
specific, the influence of trade unions in the UK has been discussed.  The national context, 
sector specific regulations and occupational differences are equally important to influence 
plant closure or employment changes at FoEs (Svalund, 2015), but the scope of this study 
does not allow us to explore further.  Future study can provide insight of the different 
mechanisms within the institutional theory framework (regulatory, normative, and cognitive) 
(Michailova and Ang, 2008), in particular, FDIs from emerging economy to the developed 
economy, to explore employment practices of cross-border businesses further.  
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Second, controversy to no influence of union between perceived subjective job insecurity and 
employee’s well-being during economic boom in Sweden (Hellgren and Chirumbolo, 2003), 
this research shows trade union can reduce objective job insecurity, layoff in the UK. It will 
be interesting to examine the role of trade union after layoff was prevented, the loyalty 
argument (Sverke and Goslinga, 2003) and the interplay between objective, subjective job 
insecurity and staff well-being. This is important with the declining union influence in the 
UK and parallel developed economy and the increased objective job insecurity (Wang et al., 
2018). 
Third, this paper has examined the difference of layoff between FoEs and DoEs, other 
characteristics of FoEs, could determine job insecurity fundamentally, inter alas, mode of 
entry and the embeddedness of FoEs into the national and regional economy.  FDIs (such as 
joint ventures) involve lower levels of resource commitment (Hill et al., 1990; Meyer et al., 
2009).  While wholly owned subsidiaries (set up on greenfield sites or through acquisition) in 
foreign locations are likely to enhance the employment benefits of inbound FDI from the host 
economy perspective (McDonald et al., 2002) and ensure more secure employment.  The 
embeddeness of FoEs is also an important aspect relating to job security. Studies have 
examined the effects of local sourcing (Bailey and Driffield, 2007; Williams, 2003), networks 
and clusters (Dunning, 2000; Mcdonald and Vertova, 2001), subsidiary and joint venture 
autonomy (Holm and Pedersen, 2000) on the creation and safeguarding of jobs.  The mode of 
entry and FoEs’ embeddedness are not available in the dataset used, and future studies can 
explore this issue further and increase our understandings in job insecurity at firm level 
(Brewster et al., 2015; Otto et al., 2016). 
6. Conclusions 
 
Against the recent global recession, we examined job insecurity at foreign-owned enterprises 
with the concern that FoEs are more “footloose”, face a high elasticity of labour demand, and 
have less pressure to preserve jobs. Using the WERS 2011 data, we found that foreign-owned 
firms appear to be more likely to make redundancy decisions and to layoff, both more 
workers and, a higher proportion of their workforce. This conforms the high employment 
volatilitye at FoEs than DoEs (Jirjahn,2017) and recession may offer a good excuse to get rid 
of less productive workers.  
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Our finding also shows that left to their own devices those senior managers in FoEs will more 
readily lay off workers in a recession than DoEs in similar circumstances in the U.K. . In all 
of this the major factor holding back compulsory redundancy decisions appears not to be the 
regulatory frame work but the actions of trade unions. Trade unions, when well supported by 
both members in the firm and national officers, can alter the balance of costs and risks in the 
decision-making process of senior managers (Pohler and Riddell, 2015).  Trade union 
arguments during the collective bargaining process can highlight alternatives to layoffs, 
policing redundancy regulations or offer better legal advice for their members, and the threat 
(even if only implied) of industrial action can give pause to the redundancy option. However, 
redundancy tendency is moderated by union strength at FoEs.   By constrast, we did not find 
any significant differences to lay off employees among the location of MNEs’ head office.   
All in all, this study complements the concerned job insecurity (plant closure) caused by 
increased FDI in the host country by investigated a new and discrete dimension, layoff, 
during economic recession. More importantly, our results show the trade union can alleviate 
the negative impact. This offers an insight on mechanism between the inconclusive 
relationship observed between MNCs, employment protection legislation and job deduction 
(Haaland et al., 2003; Wagner and Gelubcke, 2012) and is particular interest among 
developed economies where union memberships has declined in the last two decades (Jirjahn, 
2017). This finding provokes the debate on the role of trade union when there is increased 
objective job insecurity (Angrave et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018) and shed lights on  the 
uprising union organizing carried out by workers in MNCs, such as Uber driver and Ryanair 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of main variables for workplaces in the sample 
 Variables Definition Mean (S.E.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Redundant action  Compulsory or voluntary 
redundancies was taken in 
response to the recent 
recession [0,1] 
 
0.29 (0.45) 1      
2 Foreign ownership Foreign owned or control 
the workplace [0,1] 
 
0.24(0.43) 0.14** 1     
3 Ln (Workplace size)  Currently employees do 
you have on the payroll at 
this workplace [5,11605]   
 
264(820) 0.27** 0.33** 1    
4 Workplace history Number of Years this 
workplace have been in 
operation [0, 390] 
 
31(39) 0.15** 0.06* 0.24** 1   
5 Recession Impact  Workplace has been 
adversely affected by the 
recent recession [1=no 
adverse effect, 5= a great 
deal] 
 
3.25 (1.20) 0.35** -0.03 -0.04 0.05* 1  
6 Union strength Percentage of union 
member [0, 1] 
0.11(0.24) 0.08** 0.22** 0.45** 0.16** -0.02 1 








Table 2 T-test of firm characteristics between foreign-owned and domestically-owned Enterprises 
Definition Foreign-owned Enterprises UK- owned 
Enterprises 
|T| 
Redundant action 0.40(0.02) 0.25(0.01) 5.51*** 
Recession has a lot or a great deal 
adverse impact 
0.42(0.3) 0.45(0.01) 1.29 
Workplace age 33(38) 29(37) 1.68* 
Firm size 520(61) 187(20) 6.42*** 
5-49 21(1) 18(0.4) 2.37** 
50-249 132(6) 111(3) 3.49*** 
250 1101(165) 1046(127) 0.31 
Union strength 0.21(0.01) 0.08(0.00) 8.34*** 
Sector    
Manufacturing 0.25(0.02) 0.11(0.01) 6.45*** 
Electricity, gas, steam & air 0.09(0.01) 0.01(0.00) 8.14*** 
Water 0.02(0.00) 0.02(0.00) 0.69 
Construction 0.04(0.01) 0.06(0.00) 1.82 
Wholesale & retail 0.18(0.02) 0.17(0.01) 0.75 
Transportation & storage 0.07(0.01) 0.04(0.00) 1.96** 
Accommodation & food service 0.06(0.01) 0.11(0.00) 2.57*** 
Information & communication 0.06(0.01) 0.04(0.00) 2.07** 
Financial and insurance 0.06(0.01) 0.01(0.00) 4.61*** 
Professional, scientific & technical 0.07(0.01) 0.09(0.00) 1.22 
Administrative & support service 0.04(0.01) 0.07(0.00) 2.01** 
Human health & social work 0.01(0.00) 0.11(0.00) 6.10*** 
Arts, entertainment &recreation 0.01(0.00) 0.04(0.00) 2.03** 
Other service activities 0.01(0.00) 0.03(0.00) 2.25** 
Occupation of the largest group    
Higher managerial &professional 0.15(0.02) 0.07(0.00) 5.30*** 
Lower managerial& professional 0.12(0.01) 0.10(0.00) 0.88 
Intermediate occupation 0.22(0.02) 0.19(0.01) 0.82 
Lower supervisory & technical 
Occupations 
0.09(0.01) 0.05(0.00) 2.64*** 
Semi-routine occupation 0.25(0.02) 0.35(0.01) 3.18*** 
Routine 0.14(0.02) 0.22(0.01) 2.91*** 
Sample size 366 1,134  





Table 3 Probit regression on whether the firm undertook redundancy as countermeasure to the 
financial crisis and the moderating effect of trade union
1
  
Redundant action=1 Coef.(Std. Err.) Coef.(Std. Err.) 
Foreign ownership 0.23*(0.10) 0.33***(0.12) 
Firm size (ln (number of employees)) 0.21***(0.03) 0.20***(0.03) 
Firm history (ln(number of years)) 0.10*(0.04) 0.09*(0.05) 
Adverse impact by the recession 0.55***(0.04) 0.54***(0.04) 
Union strength 0.07(0.23) 0.32(0.26) 
Union strength*foreign ownership  -0.66*(0.36) 
Industry (Base group: whole sale and retail) 
Manufacture 0.19(0.14) 0.21(0.14) 
Electricity, gas, team and   -0.18(0.27) -0.08(0.27) 
Water related industry -0.28(0.36) -0.19(0.32) 
Construction  0.55***(0.19) 0.57***(0.19) 
Transportation &storage  -0.16(0.20) -0.16(0.24) 
Accommodation and food service -0.45**(0.18) -0.44**(0.18) 
Information and communication  0.20(0.23) 0.22(0.23) 
Financial and insurance activities  0.19(0.29) 0.18(0.29) 
Professional, scientific and Technology  0.58***(0.18) 0.61***(0.18) 
Administration and support service  -0.14(0.19) -0.12(0.19) 
Human health and social work  -0.65**(0.24) -0.65***(0.24) 
Arts, entertainment &recreation   0.21(0.23) 0.23(0.23) 
Other service activities  0.42(0.26) 0.43(0.26) 
Largest occupation group ( Base group: Intermediate occupation) 
Higher managerial and professional  0.21(0.17) 0.20(0.17) 
Lower managerial and professional -0.02(0.16) -0.03(0.16) 
Lower supervisory and technical  -0.28(0.18) -0.26(0.18) 
Semi-routine -0.53***(0.14) -0.52***(0.14) 
Routine occupation -0.19(0.15) -0.18(0.15) 
Number of observations 1295 1295 
Log pseudolikelihood -551.47 -549.84 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
                                                          
1
 This data excludes three sectors for which there was with no foreign ownership 
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Table 4 OLS regression on proportion of workforce made redundant if redundancy occurred 
 OLS 
Tobit  
Percentage of workforce made redundant Coef.(Std. Err.) 
 
Foreign ownership 0.05***(0.01) 
0.10**(0.04) 
Adverse impact by the recession 0.01(0.00) 
0.02(0.02) 
Firm size (ln (number of employees)) 0.01(0.01) 
0.03**(0.01) 
Firm history(ln(number of years)) -0.02**(0.07) 
-0.04**(0.01) 
Union strength -0.00(0.02) 
0.03(0.08) 








Number of observations 344 
358 
Ajusted R2 13% 
16% 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Table 5 Negative-Binomial regression on proportion of employee made redundant if redundancy 
occurred 
Number of employees made redundant Coef.(Std. Err.) 
Foreign ownership 0.92***(0.25) 
Adverse impact by the recession 0.32***(0.08) 
Firm size (ln (number of employees)) 0.71***(0.05) 
Firm history(ln(number of years)) 0.06(0.12) 
Union strength 0.54(0.53) 
Union strength*foreign ownership 0.08(0.81) 
Level of competition at overseas market 0.03(0.09) 
Level of market competition in the UK 0.31**(0.12) 
Industry Yes 
Occupation group Yes 
/lnalpha 0.77 
alpha 2.16 
Number of observations 324 
Log likelihood -865.02 
Pseudo R2 12% 




Table 6 Probit regression on the impact of headquarter location on MNEs’ redundant action 
Redundant action=1 Coef. (Std. Err.) 
UK  based FDI  
North American based FDI 0.42(0.24) 
Europe based FDI -0.22(0.22) 
Japan and other locations based FDI 0.02(0.23) 
Firm size(ln (number of employees)) 0.13**(0.06) 
Firm history(ln(number of years)) 0.18(0.09) 
Union strength -0.28(0.39) 
Adverse impact by the recession 0.58***(0.09) 
Industry Yes 
Occupation group Yes 
Number of observations 266 
Log pseudolikelihood -151.44 
Pseudo R2 0.23 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
Figure 1 Marginal effect of Union Density on the Likelihood to Make 
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